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Admission to an elite school imposes substantial risks on many students while offering modest 
academic benefits relative to admission in their most preferred non-elite school. Using variation 
in school assignment generated by the allocation mechanism, we find that admission to a system 
of elite public high schools in Mexico City increases the probability of high school dropout by 
9.4 percentage points. Students with weaker middle school grades and whose commutes are 
lengthened by elite admission experience a larger rise in dropout probability. On the other hand, 
elite admission raises end-of-high school math test scores for the marginal admittee, even when 
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I.    Introduction 
Families often have some choice in where their children attend school, and all else equal, 
most families prefer a school of higher academic quality (see, for example, Hastings, Kane, and 
Staiger 2009). Attending a “better” school, as defined by peer ability or school resources, is 
usually thought to benefit students academically. For example, a student may benefit from 
working with high-achieving and highly motivated peers and a better-funded school is able to 
afford more and better educational inputs. But there is also a risk to attending a better school, 
particularly if doing so means that the student is closer to the bottom of the school-specific 
ability distribution. The difficulty level of the coursework may prove too much for the student to 
handle. Teachers may teach mostly to the top of the class, leaving behind those who enter the 
school with a weaker academic background. An additional difficulty arises when students must 
commute farther to attend a better school instead of a nearby neighborhood school. Students 
experiencing such challenges may fail to complete their education at all, which is probably a 
much less desirable outcome than graduating from a lower-quality school. 
This paper quantifies the trade-off between academic benefit and dropout risk facing 
students admitted to a subset of Mexico City’s elite public high schools. Mexico City is ideal for 
this exercise for three reasons. First, there are large perceived disparities in public high school 
quality, with a well-identified group of “elite” schools standing above all others. This gives a 
natural definition of what an “elite” (or “better”) school is. Second, nearly all public high schools 
in the city participate in a unified merit-based admissions system, using a standardized exam and 
students’ stated preferences to allocate all students across schools. This mechanism allows us to 
credibly identify the impact of elite school admission on dropout probability and end-of-high 
school exam scores. Third, Mexico is characterized both by a high secondary school dropout rate 
and a significant estimated economic return to high school education, so the risk of dropping out 
is a first-order issue facing students. In our sample, about half of students who are assigned to a 
high school do not take the end of high school standardized exam three years later.1 At the same 
time, young men with a high school diploma have 24 percent higher wages than those who only 
completed middle school (Campos-Vazquez 2013). Though this is not a causal relationship, and 
there may be some value in attending an elite school even if the end result is dropping out, this 
wage differential is suggestive that dropping out has a real cost for students. 
A regression discontinuity design, made possible by the assignment mechanism, is used 
to discover whether students experience a change in dropout probability and in end-of-high 
school exam scores as a result of admission to an elite school, using their most-preferred non-
elite school that would admit them as the counterfactual. We find that there is a clear trade-off 
for most marginally admitted students. Admission to an elite school raises their probability of 
high school dropout by 9.4 percentage points, compared to an average probability of 42 percent 
among marginally rejected students. Along with this substantial increase in dropout probability, 
elite school admission also results (on average) in gains on the math portion of the twelfth grade 
standardized exam. Estimated effects on the Spanish section of the exam are positive but 
statistically insignificant. Because elite admission increases the probability of dropout and thus 
decreases the probability that admitted students take the standardized exam, the estimated exam 
score effects are likely to be biased. In particular, if elite schools fail out their worst students, 
then positive test score effects could reflect the composition of test-takers rather than academic 
gains. In order to provide bounds for the exam score effects in the presence of such bias, we 
apply Lee’s (2009) bounding method to the regression discontinuity setting. The resulting lower 
bound of the effect of elite admission on math scores is 0.12 standard deviations, an effect that 
3 
Dustan, de Janvry, and Sadoulet 3 
 
applies to the population of students who eventually graduate from high school whether or not 
they are assigned to an elite school. 
Students with lower middle school grade point averages experience larger increases in 
dropout probability, but there is no evidence that they experience a smaller boost in their exam 
scores from elite admission. Beyond the pressure exerted on lower-achieving students, elite 
admission increases the opportunity cost of school attendance by substantially increasing 
commuting distance to school. Mexico City is geographically very large and many students 
travel far to attend high school: the mean one-way (straight-line) commuting distance is 7.1 km, 
while ten percent of students travel 15.3 km or more each way. On average, marginally admitted 
elite school students are assigned to schools 4.5 km farther away than their most-preferred 
alternative. Marginal admission to an elite school increases dropout probability more when 
admission results in a longer commute. The problem of travel distance for elite schools is not 
unique to Mexico City. For example, Abdulkadiroglu, Angrist, and Pathak (2014) find that 
students in New York City and Boston must travel farther to attend elite “exam high schools” 
than to their next-best option. We note, however, that commuting distance is but one factor 
affecting dropout risk–in our case, elite admission increases the probability of dropout even for 
students whose commute decreases due to admission. 
Most previous studies on the effects of elite high school admission have focused on the 
impact on exam scores. Such studies typically analyze cases of merit-based admission systems, 
and use a sharp or fuzzy regression discontinuity design to estimate the effect of elite school 
admission on outcomes. Most have found zero or modest effects: Clark (2010) in the United 
Kingdom, Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2014) in Boston and New York, Lucas and Mbiti (2013) in 
Kenya, and Ajayi (2014) in Ghana all find zero or negligible impacts from elite high schools 
while Jackson (2010) and Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013) find a modest benefit of admission 
to high schools with higher-scoring peers in Trinidad and Tobago and Romania, respectively. 
Zhang (2012) exploits a randomized lottery for elite Chinese middle schools to show that elite 
admission has no significant impact on academic outcomes. Beyond the zero effect on exam 
scores, Dobbie and Freyer (2011) find that the New York elite high schools do not have an 
appreciable effect on long-run outcomes such as SAT score or college graduation. Estrada and 
Gignoux (2015) use a similar empirical strategy to ours with one year of COMIPEMS data and a 
separate survey (administered in a subsample of high schools) to estimate the effect of elite 
school admission on subjective expectations of the returns to higher education, finding that 
admission leads to higher expected returns. We will expand further on the relationship between 
their work and the present paper. 
In a much different study, Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer (2011) randomly assigned Kenyan 
schools into a tracking regime where they divided their first grade classes by student ability. 
They find that while tracking is beneficial, there is no evidence that being in a class with better 
peers is the mechanism through which these benefits are manifested. We note that in the case of 
admission to competitive elite schools, admission results both in a more able peer group as well 
as a different schooling environment with resources, management, and culture that may be quite 
different from other public schools. Thus the effect of elite school admission is a reflection of 
both the peer and institutional channels, which regression discontinuity designs such as the 
present one cannot effectively disentangle.2 
The literature on the relationship between school quality and student dropout is sparser. 
Recent studies have mostly focused on the impacts of specific aspects of quality, randomly 
varying one aspect to see if it increased school attendance, which differs from the concept of 
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dropout in that reduced attendance may not result in permanently abandoning schooling while 
dropout usually does. For example, Glewwe, Ilias, and Kremer (2010) find no effect of a teacher 
incentive pay scheme on student attendance in Kenyan public primary schools. More related to 
our study, de Hoop (2011) estimates the impact of admission to competitive, elite public 
secondary schools on dropout in Malawi. He finds that admission to such schools decreases 
dropout. This could be due to increased expected returns from an elite education inducing 
students to attend, or because the elite schools provide a more supportive environment. Our 
findings provide a stark contrast to these results, although in a much different economic and 
social context. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II gives a detailed overview of the 
Mexico City high school admissions system. Section III sets forth the method for identifying the 
effects of admission on outcomes. Section IV describes the data and Section V gives the 
empirical results. Section VI concludes. 
 
II.  Mexico City public high school system and student enrollment mechanism 
We first present the institutional environment in which Mexico City’s students choose 
high schools, followed by background information on the elite schools and an explanation of 
how they differ from other available schooling options. 
 
A.    School choice in Mexico City 
Beginning in 1996, the nine public high school subsystems in Mexico’s Federal District 
and various municipalities in the State of Mexico adopted a competitive admissions process. This 
consortium of schools is known as the Comisión Metropolitana de Institutciones Públicas de 
Educación Media Superior (COMIPEMS). COMIPEMS was formed in response to the 
inefficient high school enrollment process at the time, in which students attempted to enroll in 
several schools simultaneously and then withdrew from all but the most-preferred school that 
had accepted them. The goal of COMIPEMS was to create a unified high school admissions 
system for all public high schools in the Mexico City metropolitan area that addressed such 
inefficiencies and increased transparency in student admissions. 
Any student wishing to enroll in a public high school in the Mexico City metropolitan 
area must participate in the COMIPEMS admissions process. In February of the student’s final 
year of middle school (grade nine), informational materials are distributed to students explaining 
the rules of the admissions system and registration begins. As part of this process, students turn 
in a ranked list of up to twenty high schools that they want to attend.3 In June of that year, after 
all lists of preferred schools have been submitted, registered students take a comprehensive 
achievement examination. The exam has 128 multiple-choice questions worth one point each, 
covering a wide range of subject matter corresponding to the public school curriculum (Spanish, 
mathematics, and social and natural sciences) as well as mathematical and verbal aptitude 
sections that do not correspond directly to the curriculum. 
After the scoring process, assignment of students to schools is carried out in July by the 
National Center of Evaluation for Higher Education (CENEVAL), under the observation of 
representatives from each school subsystem and independent auditors. The assignment process 
follows the serial dictatorship mechanism (see Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez 2003) and proceeds 
as follows.4 First, each school subsystem sets the maximum number of students that it will accept 
at each high school. Then, students are ordered by their exam scores from highest to lowest. Any 
student who scored below 31 points or failed to complete middle school is disqualified from 
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participating.5 Next, a computer program proceeds in descending order through the list of 
students, assigning each student to his highest-ranked school with seats remaining when his turn 
arrives.6 If by the time a student’s turn arrives, all of his selected schools are full, he must wait 
until after the selection process is complete and choose from the schools with open slots 
remaining. This stage of the allocation takes place over several days, as unassigned students with 
the highest scores choose from available schools on the first day and the lowest scorers choose 
on the final days. 
In April of the final year of high school (grade twelve), students who are currently 
enrolled and are expected to graduate in June take a national examination called the Evaluación 
Nacional de Logro Académico en Centros Escolares (ENLACE), which tests students in Spanish 
and mathematics.7 This examination has no bearing on graduation or university admissions and 
the results have no fiscal or other consequence for high schools. The exam is given at the 
student’s school, during the regular school day, but is administered by outside proctors. It is a 
benchmark of student and school achievement and progress.8 
 
B.    Elite subsystems 
There are two elite high school subsystems in Mexico City, each affiliated with a 
prestigious national university. The Instituto Politécnico Nacional (IPN) is a university located in 
Mexico City that focuses on the sciences and engineering. It has 16 affiliated high schools in the 
city, also known for providing a rigorous education in math and science. This is the elite 
subsystem on which we will focus, for reasons that will be explained below. The other elite 
subsystem is affiliated with the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Méxcio (UNAM) and 
consists of 14 high school campuses. These schools do not stress quantitative coursework like 
the IPN, but rather offer a broader curriculum. There is an overwhelming public belief that the 
IPN and UNAM high schools are superior to the rest. For example, following the 2011 
assignment process, the major newspaper El Universal ran a story headlined “119 thousand 
students left out of the UNAM; Only 21 thousand middle school graduates win a spot at the IPN” 
(2011).9 
The seven non-elite subsystems offer a range of educational options in their 265 
campuses.10 Some have traditional academic curricula, while others offer technical and 
vocational training. During the period of study, most technical and vocational schools required 
that students choose a track offered at the campus, so students actually faced 604 non-elite 
school-track choices. Figure 1 is a map of the available schools in the COMIPEMS zone, which 
consists of the Federal District and surrounding municipalities of the State of Mexico. While all 
but two of the elite schools are located in the Federal District, several of the UNAM schools and 
most of the IPN schools are located close to the State of Mexico and are within commuting 
distance of many students residing there.11 
While the UNAM schools are public in a sense, this subsystem refuses to administer the 
ENLACE exam and is legally able to do so because of its “autonomous” status.12 The IPN, all 
other public subsystems, and many private schools administer the ENLACE, the latter doing so 
voluntarily. Because the ENLACE data provide the dependent variables for our analysis, only 
the effects of admission to IPN schools are examined in this paper. We will show in the data 
description how students attending IPN schools differ from those in the UNAM or non-elite 
schools, while in the empirical results we will see what bearing IPN admission has on the peer 
characteristics and commuting distance that students experience. 
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The configuration of the high school system does not facilitate lateral transfers of 
students between school subsystems, which are run by numerous entities at the local, state, and 
federal levels. Students who find that their current school is a bad fit cannot easily switch to a 
school in a different subsystem that balances academic rigor, curriculum, and other 
characteristics to their taste, unless they drop out of school entirely and attempt to begin anew 
elsewhere. Among public middle school students in our data, only 3.9 percent of students 
graduating within three years of COMIPEMS-taking (that is, on time) do so in a public 
subsystem different from the one to which they were admitted, and this figure is just 0.4 percent 
among IPN admittees.13 Furthermore, among IPN admittees, whom we expect to be the most in 
need of transfers for academic reasons, only 2.1 percent graduate from another public subsystem 
regardless of time to completion, while another 1.7 percent graduate from a private school. 
 
III.    Regression discontinuity design and sample definition 
The goal of this paper is to determine how much (marginal) admission to an IPN school 
changes students’ probability of dropout and their end-of-high school exam scores, compared to 
the alternative of admission to a non-elite school. Put another way, the econometric challenge is 
to estimate the effect on academic outcomes from admission to a school in an IPN subsystem 
instead of admission to the student’s most-preferred non-elite choice, holding constant all student 
characteristics, observed and unobserved. 
The COMIPEMS assignment mechanism permits a straightforward strategy for 
identifying the causal effect of IPN school admission on outcomes through a sharp regression 
discontinuity (RD) design. Each school that is oversubscribed (that is, with more demand than 
available seats) accepts all applicants at or above some cutoff COMIPEMS exam score, and 
rejects all applicants scoring below that cutoff. This cutoff is set implicitly by the score of the 
student who obtains the final seat in that school during the sequential assignment process. If a 
student lists a particular school on his preference sheet and scores below the cutoff for each of 
his more-preferred schools, admission to that school is determined entirely by whether he scored 
at or above its cutoff score.14 This generates a sharp discontinuity in the probability of admission 
(from 0 to 1) when the student’s score reaches the cutoff. 
The desired comparison is between IPN admission and non-elite admission. Thus we 
need to construct a sample of students such that assignment to “treatment” (admission to the IPN 
subsystem) depends solely on whether a student’s COMIPEMS score exceeds a predetermined 
cutoff. To achieve this, we first identify, for each student, the minimum COMIPEMS exam score 
that the student could obtain and still be assigned to an IPN school. This student-specific IPN 
admission cutoff score is known because the student’s stated preferences, combined with the 
cutoff scores for each school, fully determine the student’s assignment for any point value of the 
COMIPEMS score.15 If the IPN admission cutoff for a student is undefined because no 
COMIPEMS score would result in IPN assignment, then he is dropped from the sample.16 
In the sharp RD design employed here, a score exceeding the IPN admission cutoff 
implies treatment with probability of one. To obtain this outcome in the RD sample, we exclude 
any student who would be admitted to a non-IPN school for any point value exceeding the IPN 
admission cutoff. For example, a student might select an UNAM school with a cutoff score of 80 
as his first choice and an IPN school with a cutoff of 70 as his second choice. In this case, 
COMIPEMS scores of 80 and above would lead to UNAM assignment while scores from 70 to 
79 would lead to IPN assignment. Such students are excluded from the RD sample. This 
restriction implies that all students in the RD sample chose an IPN school as their most-preferred 
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option, so we might think of the RD sample as consisting of students with a relatively strong 
preference for IPN schools. We show in Appendix Table C1 that relaxing this restriction by 
allowing UNAM or non-elite assignments above the cutoff has only a small effect on the 
estimated effects of IPN admission. 
Finally, we want to ensure that scoring below the IPN admission cutoff score leads to 
non-elite assignment. While by construction no score below this cutoff can result in IPN 
assignment, we exclude any student whose stated choices are such that he could obtain a score 
below the IPN admission cutoff and still be admitted to an UNAM school.17 This could happen 
if, for example, the student’s first choice was an IPN school with a cutoff of 80 and his second 
choice was an UNAM school with a cutoff of 70. These three sample restrictions—existence of 
an IPN admission cutoff score, no non-IPN school assignments possible above this cutoff, and 
only non-elite school assignments below this cutoff—result in an RD sample where the 
probability of elite (IPN) assignment is zero for all COMIPEMS scores below the IPN admission 
cutoff and one for all COMIPEMS scores above it. 
Note that different scores above the student’s IPN admission cutoff could result in 
assignment to different IPN schools—for example, a score of 70 may be enough for one 
requested IPN school, while a score of 75 would be sufficient for admission to a more-preferred 
IPN school. This does not pose a problem for the RD design because the treatment is defined as 
assignment to any IPN school, not only to the school that corresponds to the student’s IPN 
admission cutoff.18 It will be useful at times in this paper to discuss this latter school, however, 
which we will refer to as the “cutoff school.” Similarly, different COMIPEMS scores below the 
cutoff may result in assignment to various non-elite schools. We will refer to the school directly 
below the cutoff—the school assignment for a score one point below the IPN admission cutoff—
as the “next-best” school. To summarize, each student is characterized by three things: his cutoff 
school (the lowest-cutoff IPN school he could attend, given his choices), his next-best school 
(the most-preferred non-elite school he could attend if he scored too low for IPN admission), and 
the cutoff score such that he would always be admitted to an IPN school if his COMIPEMS 
score were equal to or greater than this cutoff and would never be admitted to an IPN school if 
his COMIPEMS score were less than the cutoff. 
For each student i in the RD sample in exam year t, we index the cutoff school by j. 
Following Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2014), we use a stacked nonparametric RD design that 
estimates, for students with a score close to the relevant cutoff, a single average admission effect 
over all cutoff schools while controlling for separate linear terms in the COMIPEMS score for 
each cutoff school and cutoff school-COMIPEMS year fixed effects. The estimating equation is: 
(1)  𝑌!"# = 𝛿𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑡! + 𝛾!! 𝑐! − 𝑐!" + 𝛾!! 𝑐! − 𝑐!" 𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑡! + 𝜇!" + 𝜀!"# 
where 𝑌!"# is the outcome of interest (dropout or ENLACE exam score), 𝑐! − 𝑐!" (the “centered” 
COMIPEMS score) is the difference between i’s COMIPEMS score and j’s cutoff score in year t, 
and 𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑡! = 1 if 𝑐! − 𝑐!" ≥ 0. The parameter of interest is 𝛿, the local average treatment effect 
of being admitted to an IPN school instead of a non-elite school (Imbens and Lemieux 2008). 
This is an intention-to-treat effect since students do not necessarily attend a school in the 
subsystem to which they were admitted. We do not have student-level data on enrollment to 
show that students actually attend their assigned school. In practice, though, compliance with 
elite vs. non-elite assignment among ENLACE-takers is nearly perfect. Of those in the RD 
sample who take the ENLACE exam, 99.8 percent of the students rejected from the IPN 
subsystem take the exam in a non-elite school, while 96.1 percent of ENLACE exam-takers who 
were admitted to an IPN school take the exam in an IPN school. 
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We use the bandwidth selection procedure suggested by Imbens and Kalyanaraman 
(2012) and, following the same authors, use the edge kernel in estimating the local linear 
regressions.19 Cluster-robust standard errors allow for correlation within the high school to which 
the student was admitted. The running variable, centered COMIPEMS score, is discrete since the 
COMIPEMS exam is scored in one-point increments from zero to 128. Lee and Card (2008) 
suggest estimating cluster-robust standard errors with respect to the discrete values of the 
running variable, in order to account for specification error in the local polynomials. Because 
there are relatively few clusters and analytic clustered standard errors may be downward-biased 
in this case, wild-cluster bootstrapped p-values are also presented (see Cameron, Gelbach, and 
Miller 2008). We make inference based on the more conservative of the two approaches in each 
case. 
An advantage of the RD design is that it does not require any assumptions about the 
decision-making process by which students choose schools and whether their rankings of schools 
truly represent revealed preferences. Conditional on COMIPEMS score, the admitted and 
rejected students near a school’s cutoff have the same expected characteristics, including 
preferences over schools. Even if students are trying to choose strategically or making mistakes 
in their selections, this behavior will not differ by admissions outcome near the cutoff. We can 
thus remain agnostic on the issue of the distribution of student preferences and the factors that 
influence them. 
 
IV.    Data description 
A.    Data sources and descriptive statistics 
The data used in this paper come from two sources, both obtained from the Subsecretariat 
of Secondary Education of Mexico: the registration, scoring, and assignment data for the 2005 
and 2006 COMIPEMS entrance examination processes, and the scores from the 2008, 2009, and 
2010 twelfth grade ENLACE exams.20 The COMIPEMS dataset includes all students who 
registered for the exam, with their complete ranked listing of up to twenty high school 
preferences, basic background information such as middle school grade point average and 
gender, exam score out of 128 points, and the school to which the student was assigned as a 
result of the assignment process. It also includes student responses to a multiple choice 
demographic survey turned in at the time of registration for the exam. 
The ENLACE dataset consists of exam scores for all students who took the test in spring 
2008 (the first year that the twelfth grade ENLACE was given), 2009, or 2010. The scores for 
both the math and Spanish sections are reported as a continuous variable, reflecting the 
weighting of raw scores by question difficulty and other factors. We normalize the scores by 
subtracting off the year-specific mean score for all examinees in public high schools within the 
COMIPEMS geographic area and dividing by the year-specific standard deviation from this 
same sample. The ENLACE scores are matched with the 2005 and 2006 COMIPEMS-takers by 
using the Clave Única de Registro de Población (CURP), a unique identifier assigned to all 
Mexican citizens. Matching is performed by name and date of birth if no CURP match is found 
and, following that, further matching is performed on name and assigned school. Further details 
regarding the ENLACE data and its validity as a proxy for dropout are given in the next 
subsection. We limit the sample to applicants who graduated from a public middle school in 
Mexico City in the year that they took the COMIPEMS exam. We exclude students from private 
middle schools because many of these students choose to continue their education in private high 
9 
Dustan, de Janvry, and Sadoulet 9 
 
schools, a decision that is endogenous to IPN admission. We expand on this issue in the next 
subsection. 
The IPN schools are highly-demanded among these students. For every seat available in 
an IPN school, 1.9 students list an IPN school as their first choice. Every IPN school is 
oversubscribed. Figure 2 shows the distribution of cutoff scores for all oversubscribed schools. 
Panel A shows that, along with the UNAM schools, the IPN schools have far higher cutoff scores 
than the vast majority of non-elite schools. Panel B weights the cutoff schools by the number of 
students admitted, showing that nearly all students assigned to a high-cutoff school are in the 
IPN or UNAM subsystems. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the sample of all students, the subsamples of 
students who were assigned to the IPN, UNAM, and non-elite systems, and students meeting the 
criteria for inclusion in the RD sample. Students assigned to IPN schools are quite different from 
those at non-elite schools. The IPN’s student body has higher average COMIPEMS exam scores 
(88.0 points vs. 57.7), grade point (8.54/10 vs. 7.96/10), parental education (11.4 years vs. 9.8), 
family income (5,210 pesos per month vs. 3,850), and ENLACE exam scores (1.12 normalized 
score vs. -0.18).21 Students commute on average 4.33 kilometers farther to IPN schools than non-
elite options.22 While 44 percent of students assigned to non-elite schools reside in the Federal 
District rather than the generally poorer State of Mexico, 57 percent of IPN students are Federal 
District residents. Another notable contrast is that while 2/3 of IPN students are male, fewer than 
half of students in the non-elite subsystems are. This is due to higher preference for the IPN 
schools among males, perhaps because of the polytechnic focus of the curriculum. On the other 
hand, IPN students are similar to students from the UNAM schools on most dimensions, 
including COMIPEMS score, middle school GPA, and family background. Again, though, the 
IPN student body is more male-dominated than the UNAM. 
The RD sample is described in column 5. There are 41,075 students who meet these 
criteria. As expected, the mean characteristics for this group fall between the IPN and non-elite 
samples. How much did each restriction on the RD sample, described in Section III, affect the 
sample size? We start by discarding students who could not be assigned to an IPN school for any 
possible COMIPEMS score; 76,738 students remain. Dropping students who would be assigned 
to a non-IPN school for some COMIPEMS scores above the IPN admission cutoff eliminates 
26,348 students. Of these, 26,161 were dropped because some COMIPEMS scores above the 
cutoff would result in UNAM assignment. Finally, 9,315 students are dropped because they 
would be assigned to an UNAM school for some COMIPEMS scores below the IPN cutoff. 
 
B.    ENLACE-taking as a proxy for graduation 
It is clear from Table 1 that many COMIPEMS exam takers do not take the ENLACE. 
There is substantial evidence that observing ENLACE-taking in the data is a good proxy for a 
student graduating from high school. Because of this, we argue that differences in ENLACE-
taking rates between marginally admitted IPN students and their marginally rejected counterparts 
indicate true differences in graduation rates (and thus dropout rates), rather than a data problem 
or the rate at which graduating twelfth graders in IPN schools take the ENLACE exam. The 
difference cannot be due to a lower rate of success in matching ENLACE takers from IPN 
schools to their COMIPEMS score. Of all ENLACE takers in IPN schools in 2010, 99 percent 
are matched successfully to their COMIPEMS scores in 2005, 2006, or 2007. Nor does the most 
plausible alternative explanation, that IPN schools discourage their worst students from taking 
the exam, resulting in lower taking rates and higher average exam scores, appear likely. The low 
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stakes for schools and, in the early years covered in this paper, low visibility of school-level 
performance data, suggest little motive for such manipulation. 
Still, because the increase in dropout is a key result in this paper, Appendix B presents 
detailed evidence that ENLACE-taking rates are informative about dropout, much of it using 
detailed school census data. We summarize the key points here. First, we find that most dropout 
in Mexico City takes place in the tenth and eleventh grades, meaning that differential ENLACE-
taking among enrolled twelfth graders would have to be very high in order to explain the 
observed differences in taking rates. Second, on average, 99 percent of enrolled twelfth graders 
are registered in the fall to take the ENLACE in the spring, a rate that does not differ between 
IPN and non-elite schools. Third, while some of these registered students drop out or repeat 
twelfth grade and thus do not take the ENLACE in the current year, on average schools 
administer the ENLACE to 98 percent as many students as they graduate in that year. Again, this 
figure does not differ between IPN and non-elite schools. These high registration and taking rates 
make it unlikely that schools are strategically administering the exam. Fourth, re-taking of the 
ENLACE is found to be almost nonexistent in the student-level data (0.25 percent), ruling out a 
situation where some types of schools administer the ENLACE to all twelfth graders regardless 
of whether they are graduating or not (and thus administer the exam twice to twelfth grade 
repeaters). Fifth, because we exclude private middle school students from the sample, differential 
enrollment in private high schools (about 1/3 of which do not participate in the ENLACE and 
thus lead to students being counted as dropouts here) can have at most very small effect on the 
results. While private middle school students rejected from the IPN are shown to be much more 
likely to leave the public school system, this is untrue for public middle school students. Finally, 
we find that marginal admission to a non-elite school does not increase the probability of 
dropout, inconsistent with a general strategy by all schools to discourage ENLACE-taking 
among their worst students.23 
 
C.    Correlates of dropout 
Dropout is predicted both by academic ability and IPN admission, as shown by the partial 
correlations presented in Table 2. Column 1 shows that, in the cross-section, COMIPEMS exam 
score and middle school grade point average (GPA) are negatively correlated with dropout. 
Particularly striking is the GPA coefficient, showing that a one standard deviation (0.82) increase 
in GPA predicts a 14 percentage point decrease in dropout probability. Parental education is 
negatively correlated with dropout as well, but the magnitude of the coefficient is very small 
compared to those of COMIPEMS score and GPA. Students taking the COMIPEMS exam in 
2006 have a lower probability of taking the ENLACE in our sample, but this is mostly due to the 
fact that a small number of students take five years to complete high school and we only have 
ENLACE data through 2010.24 Students residing in the Federal District have an 8.7 percentage 
point higher probability of dropout, perhaps because there are better opportunities for dropouts in 
the local labor market. Column 2 adds high school fixed effects and shows that these 
relationships are similar within a high school, although the Federal District coefficient falls by 
more than half. Column 3 adds commuting distance, which is missing in about 14 percent of 
cases due to an inability to match students’ reported postal codes with geographical coordinates. 
Here we see that commuting distance positively predicts dropout: a 10 kilometer increase in 
commute predicts a 3.0 percentage point increase in dropout probability. Column 4 shows that, 
conditional on listing an IPN school as one’s first choice, dropout is much higher for students 
admitted to IPN schools than for those admitted to non-elite schools. This correlation does not 
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have a causal interpretation, however, because unobservable student attributes could affect both 
selection into an IPN school and dropout probability. The next section uses the RD design to 
establish the causal IPN admission-dropout relationship. 
 
V.    Effects of elite school admission 
This section uses the RD design outlined in Section III to estimate the effect of marginal 
admission to an IPN school on the probability of dropping out of high school and, conditional on 
taking the ENLACE exam, on the exam score obtained. 
 
A.    School characteristics and commute 
Before presenting the effects of IPN admission on dropout and test scores, we show that 
admission results in students being assigned to a school with drastically more able peers while 
also needing to commute a longer distance to reach their assigned school. Table 3 and 
corresponding Figure 3 show the results from estimating Equation 1 with peer characteristics and 
commute distance as the dependent variables.25 On average, marginal IPN admission implies 
assignment to a school where peers scored 19.8 COMIPEMS points (more than one standard 
deviation) higher than the next-best school. Peers also have, on average, middle school GPAs 
0.52 points (0.62 standard deviations) higher than the next-best school and have parents with 1.2 
additional years of education.26 Students also experience longer commutes due to IPN admission, 
traveling 4.5 kilometers farther in each direction, nearly 50 percent more than the RD sample 
average. Thus IPN admission, on average, exposes students to much “better” peers while 
requiring a longer commute. 
 
B.    Probability of dropout 
Marginal admission to an IPN school significantly increases the probability of dropout. 
Figure 4 illustrates this graphically, plotting the dropout rate in a 20 point window around the 
IPN admission cutoff. Table 4 confirms this finding, reporting the average effect of admission on 
dropout estimated using Equation 1 for the optimal bandwidth (column 1). The estimated 
dropout effect is large, 9.4 percentage points compared to a dropout rate of about 42 percent 
among marginally rejected students.27 This result is robust across different bandwidth selections: 
estimates using half (column 2) and double (column 3) the optimal bandwidth are 9.3 and 11.0 
percentage points, respectively. We note that the optimal bandwidth is 15.3 COMIPEMS points, 
somewhat less than one standard deviation of this score in the RD sample over which this 
bandwidth is computed (18.49 points). Use of the edge kernel puts more weight on data near the 
cutoff, so 55 percent of the summed weights come from observations within five points of the 
cutoff score.28 
The increase in dropout is accompanied by a higher rate of delayed high school 
completion, as shown in column 4. The dependent variable in this regression is a dummy equal 
to one if the student either dropped out (did not take the ENLACE) or took the ENLACE more 
than three years after participating in the admissions process, indicating a delay of one or more 
years. The estimated effect of IPN admission on dropout or delay is 12.4 percentage points, three 
percentage points higher than the estimated impact on dropout alone. Consistent with this 
finding, we provide descriptive evidence in Appendix Table B1 that grade repetition rates in IPN 
schools are generally higher than in non-elite schools.29 
There is important heterogeneity behind the average effect of IPN admission on dropout. 
Table 5 presents these results, which are estimated using the following equation: 
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(2)  𝑌!"# = 𝛿𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑡! + 𝛾!! 𝑐! − 𝑐!" + 𝛾!! 𝑐! − 𝑐!" 𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑡! + 𝜇!" + 𝑧!"# 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑡! + 𝛾!! 𝑐! − 𝑐!" + 𝛾!! 𝑐! − 𝑐!" 𝑎𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑡! + 𝜀!"# 
where 𝑧!"# is a de-meaned covariate representing some dimension of heterogeneity in the 
admission effect. 
Students with lower middle school GPAs experience a higher increase in dropout 
probability. The estimates in column 1 indicate the effect of admission on dropout decreases by 
4.8 percentage points for each additional grade point. This suggests that an important driver of 
dropout for (marginal) IPN students is the academic difficulties that accompany being a 
relatively weak student in a demanding school. Column 2 fails to find any heterogeneity with 
respect to parental education level. 
Column 3 gives results for the differential effects with respect to changes in commuting 
distance. The “change in commute” variable is constructed by subtracting the commuting 
distance to the next-best school from the commuting distance to the IPN cutoff school. The 
longer the commute induced by admission, the higher is the effect on dropout: an additional 
kilometer of one-way commuting distance increases the probability of dropout by 0.5 percentage 
points. In order to understand whether this commuting effect is unique to IPN admission, in 
Appendix Table C4 we estimate the differential effect of admission with respect to distance for 
the full set of non-elite oversubscribed schools. The differential effect for that set of schools is 
0.004 (SE=0.0011), similar to the finding from the IPN cutoff schools. It seems, then, that the 
differential effect of admission with respect to commuting distance is a general result in this 
sample.30 
Column 4 repeats the commuting distance differential construction exercise, except that 
now the differential is with respect to the mean COMIPEMS scores of the incoming high school 
cohort. We do not find evidence of heterogeneity with respect to this peer ability measure. 
Column 5 finds no differential effect for students residing in the Federal District, which is in 
general more prosperous than the neighboring State of Mexico and contains all but one of the 
IPN schools.31 Column 6 jointly estimates the differential effects and finds that the changes in 
estimated coefficients are small.32 
To test for the possibility that increased commuting distance and low academic ability 
interact to increase dropout risk even more than each factor does by itself, we estimate Equation 
2 including both de-meaned middle school GPA and de-meaned change in commuting distance, 
along with their interaction and the interaction of this term with the piecewise-linear centered 
COMIPEMS terms and the admission dummy. Column 7 shows that the coefficient on the triple 
interaction admission term is negative and significant, indicating that low GPA and longer 
commuting distance interact to make a student more likely to drop out. For example, if we 
compare the effects of a 4.49 km increase in commute (the average induced by IPN admission) 
between students with a one-point difference in GPA, the student with the lower GPA will suffer 
an additional 4.5 percentage point (−0.010 ∗ 4.49 ∗ −1) increase in dropout probability. 
These results make clear that dropout is systematically related to IPN admission and its 
interaction with academic ability as proxied by middle school GPA. Students admitted to an IPN 
school are on average more likely to drop out and thus less likely to take the ENLACE, such that 
even after conditioning on COMIPEMS score, IPN admittees taking the ENLACE have higher 
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If 𝑥! is balanced across the cutoff, then 𝜙! should be close to zero. Table 6, Panel A and 
accompanying Figure 5 give estimates at the time of assignment (prior to dropout), where we 
expect balance. Of the seven covariates tested, none are found to change discontinuously at the 
cutoff. When estimating the equations jointly using seemingly unrelated regression and 
performing a joint test for discontinuities, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no discontinuity 
(p = 0.46). Panel B, however, shows that within the sample of ENLACE takers middle school 
GPA is unbalanced (about 1/10 standard deviations higher for admitted students) as well as hours 
studied per week in middle school. The joint test of discontinuities is rejected at the 0.01 
significance level. Hence dropout among marginally admitted students is not only higher than 
among the rejected, but it is also heterogeneous with respect to student characteristics. This 
differential dropout may bias upward estimates of the IPN admission effect on ENLACE exam 
scores if the additional dropout is among the students who would have the lowest ENLACE 
scores. We will estimate bounds of the ENLACE effects that account for this possibility. 
 
C.    ENLACE exam performance 
We now turn to the effect of IPN admission on the standardized ENLACE exam score. 
We first ignore the differential dropout issue raised in the previous section and then bound the 
effects while accounting for dropout. Using all observed scores, Figure 6, suggests that there is a 
large, positive effect of IPN admission on ENLACE math scores and a much smaller positive 
effect on Spanish scores. This result may be unsurprising given that IPN schools focus heavily 
on mathematics, engineering, and the sciences in their curriculum. Table 7 reports the RD 
estimates of these relationships for the optimal bandwidth (columns 1 and 4) and both half and 
double this bandwidth (columns 2 and 5, and 3 and 6, respectively). Again, the results are robust 
to the choice of bandwidth: the estimated effects on math scores range from 0.22 to 0.25 standard 
deviations, while the Spanish estimates range from 0.04 to 0.05 standard deviations but are 
statistically insignificant. 
We address the potential for bias due to differential dropout in two ways.33 First, we 
apply the sharp bounds approach proposed by Lee (2009) to the RD design. In the context of a 
randomized controlled trial, the Lee bounds process begins by estimating the degree of 
differential attrition between treatment and control groups, trimming observations from the group 
(treatment or control) with lower attrition in order to balance the post-trimming attrition rates. In 
the case that attrition is higher in the treatment group (as in our case), trimming is accomplished 
either by dropping control observations with the lowest values of the outcome variable (to obtain 
a lower bound on the treatment effect) or with the highest values (to obtain an upper bound). 
Estimation of the original relationship of interest is then carried out using the trimmed sample in 
order to obtain bounds on the treatment effect. In order to apply this procedure to an RD design, 
we assume that the dropout effect is constant within the selected bandwidth. This allows us to 
trim the same proportion of rejected students for each value of the centered COMIPEMS score, 
since excess dropout was among the admitted students. We then carry out the RD estimation 
procedure with the trimmed sample. Standard errors are bootstrapped, where each repetition 
includes the dropout effect stage, the subsequent trimming based on the estimated differential 
dropout, and the final estimation of the lower bound. 
Estimated upper and lower bounds are found in the bottom rows of Table 7. Despite the 
extreme approach of trimming the worst-performing students, the lower bound of the effect on 
math scores is large and strongly significant: 0.12 (SE = 0.04). The Spanish bound is negative: -
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0.11 (SE = 0.04), as expected since the original point estimate was small. We assess the 
robustness of the bounding procedure in Appendix Table C2 by implementing it with the 
rectangular kernel and a range of bandwidths. Even when the bandwidth is very small, so that the 
extrapolation of the attrition rate is over only a small range, the estimated bounds are very 
similar. 
A second approach is to estimate the effect of admission on the joint probability of taking 
the ENLACE exam and obtaining at least a pre-specified “threshold” score on the exam. This is 
equivalent to imputing an arbitrarily negative score for non-takers and estimating the effect of 
admission on the probability of exceeding an ENLACE score threshold. The motivation for this 
exercise is that while IPN admission decreases the probability of graduation, it is possible that 
admission increases the probability (unconditional on graduation) of graduating with a high 
exam score. After fixing a threshold ENLACE score, the standard local linear regression in 
Equation 1 is estimated with the joint ENLACE taking-exceeding threshold measure as the 
dependent variable. Figure 7 shows the estimated admission coefficients, estimated for a range of 
different fixed values of the threshold score. The math score effects in Panel A are positive 
beginning at a score of 0 and are significant for scores in the range 0.7-2.3. As expected, the 
Spanish effects in Panel B are negative for most scores, although the point estimates do become 
positive at a score of 1.3. Hence, for math scores in particular, the results are consistent with elite 
admission increasing the probability of graduating with a high ENLACE score while 
simultaneously increasing dropout and therefore decreasing the probability of graduating with a 
low score. 
The dropout results showed striking heterogeneity with respect to middle school GPA 
and changes in commuting distance. We repeat this exercise for ENLACE scores in Table 8, 
interpreting with caution because these estimates may be biased due to the differential dropout 
that has been documented thus far. While we are unable to detect any heterogeneity in the 
admission effects on math scores, we do find that admission increases Spanish scores more for 
students with lower GPAs and for students with relatively more favorable commutes due to 
admission. The differential effect with respect to GPA may indicate that IPN schools induced 
catch-up among lower-ability students, but it is also consistent with differential dropout among 
the lowest-ability of the low-GPA students. When we apply the Lee bounding procedure while 
allowing for heterogeneity in the dropout effect, we cannot reject heterogeneous effects of elite 
admission on exam scores with respect to GPA that are positive (consistent with stronger 
students learning more, in addition to being less likely to drop out) or negative (consistent with 
weaker students learning more from a more rigorous curriculum that also increases their dropout 
risk).34 The differential effect with respect to commuting distance may be due to the effects of a 
shorter commute, or it could simply reflect a different composition of schools that are close to 
and far from the IPN schools.35 Thus we interpret the heterogeneity results as suggestive but not 





D.    Effects of admission to a higher-cutoff IPN school 
In order to gain further insight into why IPN admission affects dropout and test scores, 
we briefly investigate the effects of being admitted to a higher-cutoff IPN school, compared to 
the counterfactual of admission to a lower-cutoff IPN school. We begin with the already-
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described RD sample and identify, separately for each IPN school, the corresponding school-
specific sample. The sample for IPN school A consists of students whose counterfactual 
assignment is to A for COMIPEMS score equal to A’s cutoff score and whose counterfactual 
assignment is to another IPN school for the COMIPEMS score one below A’s cutoff. These are 
students who, very near the cutoff score, are either barely admitted to A or barely rejected and 
sent to a different IPN school. Having constructed such a sample for each IPN school, we stack 
the school-specific samples and estimate Equation 1. 
Table 9 begins by showing that admission to a higher-cutoff IPN school results in a 
somewhat different peer group: the mean peer COMIPEMS score is 4.7 points higher (compared 
to the 20 point jump from non-IPN to IPN schools), while mean peer middle school GPA is 0.12 
points greater and peers’ parents have on average 0.3 years more of education. On average, 
students commute 2.3 kilometers less due to admission, in contrast with the increased commute 
due to admission at the IPN/non-IPN boundary. The point estimate for the effect of admission on 
dropout is 2 percentage points, but the 95 percent confidence interval ranges from -1.7 to 5.5 
percentage points. Thus it is unclear how admission to a “better” IPN school affects dropout 
probability, except that we can rule out effects as large as those from the non-IPN to IPN 
comparison.36 On the other hand, the estimated admission effects on ENLACE math and Spanish 
scores are 0.075 and 0.061 standard deviations, respectively, and both are significantly different 
from zero. It seems that students do benefit marginally from attending a higher-cutoff IPN 
school, at least in terms of ENLACE performance. 
 
E.    Effects of admission to a competitive non-elite school 
There exist schools outside the elite subsystems that have fairly high cutoff scores, as 
Figure 2 shows. In the interest of understanding whether the admission effects we have found are 
particular to elite schools, or if they pertain more generally to schools with relatively high cutoff 
scores, we explore the effects of admission to non-elite schools with cutoff scores at least as high 
as the lowest-cutoff IPN school (66 points). To do so, we identify for each of these schools the 
sample of students who, due to their stated preferences, would be admitted to that school if they 
obtained (exactly) the cutoff score. Note that, for this sample, there is a sharp change in the 
probability of assignment to the cutoff school at the cutoff score, from exactly 0 to exactly 1. 
While higher scores may result in assignment to more-preferred schools, the sharp change in 
assignment probability at the cutoff allows us to apply the sharp RD design. We then stack the 
samples for each cutoff school and estimate Equation 1.37 
Marginal admission to these schools has effects that are very different from attending an 
IPN school, as shown in Table 10. Admitted students experience increases in mean peer 
COMIPEMS score, GPA, and parental education, although in each case these increases are only 
about half of those resulting from marginal IPN admission. Admission, on average, decreases 
students’ commute slightly. In contrast with the IPN results, the estimated effect on dropout is 
small and negative. Estimated effects on ENLACE exam scores are close to zero and statistically 
insignificant for both math and Spanish. The dramatic difference in effects between IPN and 
high-cutoff non-elite schools suggests that particular features of IPN attendance—higher 
academic rigor and longer commutes, for example—drive their large admission effects. 
 
F.    Validity checks 
There is no a priori reason to think that the RD design might be invalid. Because the 
school-specific cutoff scores are determined in the process of the computerized assignment 
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process, monitored by school subsystem representatives and independent auditors, there is no 
opportunity for student scores to be manipulated in order to push particular students from 
marginal rejection to marginal admission. Nevertheless, Figure 8 provides graphical evidence of 
the design’s validity, showing the distribution of centered COMIPEMS scores for students in the 
RD sample. Panel A shows the entire density, while Panel B zooms in on a smaller window 
around the cutoff. There is no visual evidence for a jump in the density of COMIPEMS score to 
one side of the cutoff or the other. We test formally for a discontinuous change in the density, 
following McCrary (2008). The p-value for this test is 0.90, in agreement with the visual 
evidence presented. 
As further support for the RD design, we recall the balance of baseline covariates across 
the admission cutoff shown in Figure 5 and Table 6, Panel A. The lack of a discontinuity in these 
covariates suggests that students were unable to sort into or out of IPN admission, as we would 
expect given the computerized assignment process. 
As with any study using a RD approach, there may be some skepticism in extrapolating 
the effects for marginal students to the rest of the sample. This would be a particular concern if 
there were few students near the margin compared to the total population of IPN students. The 
nature of the assignment mechanism, however, tends to bunch students near the cutoff of the 
school to which they are admitted, since a modestly higher score would often lead to admission 
to a more-preferred school. Similarly, many of the students admitted to the IPN subsystem are 
only a few points away from rejection and assignment to a non-IPN school. In fact, 34 percent of 
students admitted to an IPN school are within seven COMIPEMS points of falling out of the IPN 
subsystem, while more than half are within 12 points of the boundary. The standard deviation of 
COMIPEMS score in the full sample is 17.95 and the within-school standard deviation for IPN 
students is 7.19, implying that a significant portion of IPN students are not far from the margin 
of the IPN subsystem. 
 
VI.    Discussion 
This paper used Mexico City’s high school allocation mechanism to identify the effects 
of admission to a subset of its elite public schools, relative to their non-elite counterparts. At 
least for marginally admitted students, elite schools present an important trade-off. Elite 
admission appears to positively affect student math test scores, even under the conservative 
assumptions used to produce a lower bound for this effect. However, admission is found to 
significantly increase the probability of dropping out of school. Students with lower middle 
school GPAs are particularly adversely affected, suggesting that elite schools are too challenging 
for some students and they either fail out or elect to leave school because of it. Mexico City’s 
expansive geographical footprint, along with the relatively-concentrated elite school locations, 
allow us to see how changes in commuting distance affect dropout. We find that commuting 
imposes a significant cost on students in terms of dropout probability. 
Why do many students who are most likely to encounter a higher dropout probability due 
to elite admission—in particular those with lower GPAs and those who live far from elite 
schools—continue to choose elite schools? Even if students understand this trade-off, they may 
value the expected academic gains or labor market advantage of an elite credential sufficiently 
that they are willing to bear the additional risk of dropping out. On the other hand, perhaps 
students do not realize that elite admission increases dropout risk. Dustan (2016) observes that 
when students witness an older sibling drop out, they are less likely to choose that school during 
the COMIPEMS application process compared to the case where the older sibling graduates. 
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This suggests that there is incomplete information about school characteristics or student-school 
match quality. Bobba and Frisancho (2014) find that many students taking part in COMIPEMS 
have upward-biased beliefs about their own abilities, such that when they receive a signal about 
their ability, their choice portfolios shift away from elite schools. Thus it may be that students 
know that elite admission increases dropout probability on average, but do not expect this to 
affect them personally. Students may also fail to anticipate other challenges associated with 
being a low performer at an elite school, for example social exclusion (see, for example, Pop-
Eleches and Urquiola 2013 and Weinberg 2007). 
The existence of this trade-off between academic benefit and dropout probability 
highlights an important educational policy issue in Mexico. As explained in Section II, 
transferring between subsystems is difficult, in part because accumulated credits do not 
necessarily transfer. The Comprehensive High School Education Reform (RIEMS) represents an 
attempt to rectify this by imposing a (partial) common curriculum, but this reform has faced 
delays and political opposition and its future remains in question.38 Such rigidity in the current 
system may explain why the academic benefit-dropout trade-off is so strong in this paper in 
comparison to studies in other countries. Our result highlights the value of flexibility in choice-
based admissions systems so that the consequences of a “bad” choice can be mitigated, provided 
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Panel A. Unweighted frequency 
 
Panel B. Weighted frequency 
 
Figure 2 
Distribution of admission cutoff scores for oversubscribed schools, 2005 exam year 
Notes: Panel B weights oversubscribed schools by the number of students assigned, so that the 
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Panel A. Mean COMIPEMS exam score 
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Panel C. Mean parental education 
 
Panel D. Distance from home to school 
 
Figure 3 
Effect of IPN admission on school characteristics experienced by student 
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Effect of IPN admission on dropout probability 
Notes. Dropout is defined as not taking the ENLACE exam. Plot is for students belonging to the 
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Balance of baseline covariates with respect to IPN admission 
Notes. Dependent variables are indicated on the vertical axes. Plots are for students belonging to 


























































































-20 -10 0 10 20
Centered score
26 
Dustan, de Janvry, and Sadoulet 26 
 
Panel A. Math score 
 
Panel B. Spanish score 
 
Figure 6 
Effect of IPN admission on end-of-high school ENLACE exam scores 
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Panel A. Math score 
 
Panel B. Spanish score 
 
Figure 7 
Effect of IPN admission on probability of taking ENLACE and scoring above thresholds 
Notes. Solid line represents RD estimates of the effect of admission on joint probability of taking 
the ENLACE exam and scoring above the score given on the x-axis. Dashed lines give the 95% 
confidence interval for these estimates. 
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Panel B. Density within 20 points of cutoff
 
Figure 8 
Density of centered COMIPEMS scores for students in the regression discontinuity sample 
Notes: Panel B is a closer view of the centered score values near the cutoff, presented in order to 
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Characteristics of students eligible for assignment 




students RD sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Male 0.46 0.65 0.47 0.44 0.62 
 
(0.50) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) 
Maximum of mother's and father's 
education 
10.18 11.38 11.76 9.77 10.71 
(3.35) (3.23) (3.40) (3.23) (3.25) 
Family income (thousand 
pesos/month)a 
4.22 5.21 5.75 3.85 4.62 
(3.35) (3.64) (4.08) (3.07) (3.38) 
Hours studied per week 5.19 6.22 6.58 4.83 5.56 
 
(3.26) (3.33) (3.34) (3.14) (3.31) 
Index of parental effortb -0.03 0.12 0.18 -0.08 0.04 
 
(1.00) (0.95) (0.97) (1.00) (0.97) 
Student is employed 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 
 
(0.19) (0.18) (0.15) (0.20) (0.20) 
Middle school grade point average             
(of 10) 
8.10 8.54 8.65 7.96 8.29 
(0.82) (0.79) (0.79) (0.77) (0.79) 
Distance from assigned school 7.14 10.66 9.40 6.33 9.22 
(kilometers)c (6.14) (7.36) (6.73) (5.60) (7.13) 
Resides in Federal District 0.48 0.57 0.66 0.44 0.50 
 
(0.50) (0.49) (0.47) (0.50) (0.50) 
Number of schools ranked 9.31 9.82 9.45 9.23 9.72 
 
(3.59) (3.75) (3.70) (3.55) (3.70) 
IPN school as first choice 0.15 0.90 0.03 0.10 1.00 
 
(0.36) (0.30) (0.18) (0.30) (0.00) 
Number of IPN schools chosen 1.18 4.39 1.24 0.84 3.95 
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(1.89) (2.58) (1.64) (1.49) (2.64) 
UNAM school as first choice 0.49 0.10 0.97 0.45 0.00 
 
(0.50) (0.30) (0.18) (0.50) (0.00) 
Number of UNAM schools chosen 2.53 1.96 4.88 2.20 1.24 
 
(2.60) (2.17) (2.52) (2.44) (1.74) 
Preference ranking of assigned 
school (conditional of assignment) 
3.30 1.69 1.90 3.80 2.73 
(2.90) (1.52) (1.53) (3.08) (2.48) 
COMIPEMS examination score 63.74 87.96 85.57 57.66 74.63 
 
(17.95) (11.06) (9.90) (14.29) (18.49) 
Dropped out (did not take ENLACE 








ENLACE examination score (for 







Observations 354,581 28,551 46,265 279,765 41,075 
Notes. Standard deviations in parentheses. 
a Average 2005-2006 exchange rate was 10.9 pesos/dollar. 
b The parental effort index is constructed by averaging the scores (1-4 ordinal scale) for 13 questions about parental effort and 
involvement from the survey filled out at the time of COMIPEMS registration. The survey asked “How often do your parents or 
adults with whom you live do the following activities?” for activities such as “help you with schoolwork” and “attend school 
events.” The measure is normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation of 1 in the sample of all students. 
c Distance is calculated as the straight-line distance between the centroid of the student's postal code and the assigned school. 
d The normalized ENLACE examination score is constructed by subtracting off the year-specific mean score for all examinees 
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Table 2 
     Correlates of high school dropout (not taking ENLACE exam) 
Dependent variable: dropout (not taking 
ENLACE exam)*100 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
COMIPEMS score -0.28*** -0.26*** -0.29*** -0.35*** -0.28*** 
 
(0.054) (0.034) (0.015) (0.045) (0.018) 
Middle school GPA -16.56*** -16.80*** -17.41*** -16.74*** -17.50*** 
 
(0.679) (0.598) (0.259) (0.708) (0.253) 
Parental education (years) -0.42*** -0.51*** -0.52*** -0.43*** -0.50*** 
 
(0.055) (0.033) (0.037) (0.057) (0.041) 
Family income (thousand pesos/month) 0.01 -0.12*** -0.14*** -0.00 -0.09** 
 
(0.060) (0.033) (0.038) (0.063) (0.041) 
Male 0.07 -0.26 -0.18 -0.26 0.13 
 
(0.425) (0.241) (0.268) (0.361) (0.315) 
Hours studied per week -0.24*** -0.28*** -0.32*** -0.25*** -0.30*** 
 
(0.044) (0.037) (0.034) (0.045) (0.034) 
Parental effort index -1.00*** -0.99*** -0.99*** -1.00*** -1.06*** 
 
(0.119) (0.095) (0.106) (0.120) (0.109) 
Employed 7.92*** 7.59*** 7.50*** 7.91*** 7.82*** 
 
(0.539) (0.501) (0.523) (0.534) (0.532) 
Resides in Federal District 8.65*** 3.90** 2.93*** 8.35*** 7.46*** 
 
(1.279) (1.765) (0.356) (1.337) (0.723) 
Exam year 2006 3.85*** 3.59*** 3.64*** 3.98*** 3.85*** 
 
(0.465) (0.453) (0.498) (0.469) (0.516) 









IPN school as first choice 
   
-1.61*** -1.91*** 
    
(0.486) (0.452) 
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Admitted to IPN school 
   
8.77*** 6.98*** 
    
(1.626) (1.648) 
      Admitted high school fixed effects NO YES YES NO NO 
Observations 253,506 253,506 218,870 253,506 218,870 
Adjusted R2 0.118 0.150 0.148 0.120 0.123 
Mean of dependent variable 48.7 48.7 46.9 48.7 46.9 
Notes. Sample excludes students assigned to an UNAM high school, since these schools do not proctor the ENLACE exam used 
as the proxy for graduation. Standard errors, clustered at high school level, in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 3 











home to school 
(kilometers) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Score ≥ cutoff 19.809*** 0.520*** 1.184*** 4.487*** 
 
(0.8282) (0.0213) (0.0694) (0.3777) 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
     Observations 18,618 22,253 19,873 22,175 
Adjusted R-squared 0.788 0.766 0.648 0.102 
Mean of dependent variable 1 point below cutoff 64.390 7.872 10.119 6.931 
Bandwidth 13.9 16.5 14.7 17.5 
Notes. Estimates are from local linear regressions, including separate linear terms for each of the 16 IPN cutoff 
schools and cutoff school-year fixed effects. The edge kernel is used in each regression and in computation of 
the corresponding optimal Imbens-Kalyanaraman bandwidth. Dependent variables in columns 1-3 are mean 
characteristics of all students admitted to the student's admitted school in his admission year. Standard errors 
clustered at the admitted high school level are in parentheses. Wild cluster bootstrapped p-values, clustered at 
the centered COMIPEMS score level, are in brackets. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 4 
       Regression discontinuity estimates of effect of IPN admission on dropout 
Dependent variable Dropout (not taking ENLACE exam)   Dropout or late ENLACE (4+ years) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
Score ≥ cutoff 0.094*** 0.093*** 0.110*** 
 
0.124*** 0.121*** 0.144*** 
 
(0.0167) (0.0202) (0.0150) 
 
(0.0174) (0.0220) (0.0172) 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
        Observations 20,281 11,122 35,475 
 
17,748 9,783 32,658 
Adjusted R-squared 0.014 0.018 0.016 
 
0.022 0.026 0.021 
Mean of dependent variable 1 point below cutoff 0.416 0.416 0.416 
 
0.490 0.490 0.490 
Bandwidth 15.3 7.6 30.6 
 
13.5 6.7 26.9 
Notes. Estimates are from local linear regressions, including separate linear terms for each of the 16 IPN cutoff schools and cutoff 
school-year fixed effects. The edge kernel is used in each regression and in computation of the corresponding optimal Imbens-
Kalyanaraman bandwidth. Standard errors clustered at the school level are in parentheses. Wild cluster bootstrapped p-values, 
clustered at the centered COMIPEMS score level, are in brackets. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 5 
       Regression discontinuity estimates of heterogeneous effects of IPN admission on dropout 
Dependent variable: dropout (not taking 
ENLACE exam) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Score ≥ cutoff 0.092*** 0.095*** 0.105*** 0.107*** 0.093*** 0.108*** 0.106*** 
 
(0.0169) (0.0164) (0.0173) (0.0165) (0.0167) (0.0178) (0.0171) 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
(Score ≥ cutoff) * (Middle school GPA) -0.048*** 








    
[0.00] [0.00] 
(Score ≥ cutoff) * (Parental education) 
 
-0.005 










   
[0.16] 
 (Score ≥ cutoff) * (Change in commute 












(Score ≥ cutoff) * change in mean HS 
peer COMIPEMS exam score due to 
admission) 














 (Score ≥ cutoff) * (Student resides in 
Federal District)     
-0.026 0.004 
 
    
(0.0323) (0.0421) 
 
     
[0.36] [0.94] 
 (Score ≥ cutoff) * (Middle school GPA) * 
(Change in commute due to admission)       
-0.010*** 
      
(0.0029) 
       
[0.00] 
        Observations 20,259 20,614 13,567 13,589 20,281 11,435 13,550 
Adjusted R-squared 0.098 0.016 0.022 0.019 0.019 0.110 0.108 
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Mean of dependent variable 1 point below 
cutoff 0.415 0.408 0.403 0.402 0.416 0.397 0.401 
Bandwidth 15.5 16.5 13.4 12.4 15.3 12.2 13.0 
Notes. Estimates are from local linear regressions, including separate linear terms for each of the 16 IPN cutoff schools, cutoff school-
year fixed effects, and covariates whose interaction terms are included in the regression. Piecewise-linear terms in centered COMIPEMS 
score are interacted with the corresponding de-meaned covariate in each column. Column 7 includes the interaction of the de-meaned 
middle school GPA and change in commuting distance variables, and this measure's interaction with piecewise-linear terms in centered 
COMIPEMS score. The edge kernel is used in each regression and in computation of the corresponding optimal Imbens-Kalyanaraman 
bandwidths. Standard errors clustered at the admitted high school level are in parentheses. Wild cluster bootstrapped p-values, clustered 
at the centered COMIPEMS score level, are in brackets. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 6 
       Tests for balance of baseline covariates with respect to IPN assignment 















effort index Employed 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Score ≥ cutoff -0.019 0.091 0.091 -0.002 0.090 -0.036 -0.000 
 
(0.0199) (0.0915) (0.0903) (0.0137) (0.0946) (0.0260) (0.0052) 
 
[0.09] [0.28] [0.30] [0.86] [0.32] [0.23] [0.93] 
        Observations 27,136 18,414 18,188 25,007 19,519 17,351 21,007 
Adjusted R-squared 0.069 0.017 0.012 0.096 0.014 0.003 0.001 
Mean of dependent variable 1 point below 
cutoff 8.23 10.63 4.36 0.64 5.38 0.10 0.04 
Standard deviation of dependent variable 0.71 3.28 2.95 0.48 3.26 0.97 0.20 
Bandwidth 21.2 15.2 15.2 18.8 15.9 13.7 17.6 
p-value, joint significance of all admission 
coefficients 0.46             
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Score ≥ cutoff 0.074*** 0.182 0.113 -0.011 0.272*** 0.046 -0.001 
 
(0.0227) (0.1110) (0.1178) (0.0163) (0.1033) (0.0330) (0.0054) 
 
[0.00] [0.15] [0.35] [0.37] [0.03] [0.23] [0.87] 
        Observations 17,752 15,782 12,815 18,289 16,242 11,160 16,253 
Adjusted R-squared 0.105 0.028 0.016 0.102 0.025 0.004 0.000 
Mean of dependent variable 1 point below cutoff 8.39 10.75 4.36 0.60 5.65 0.09 0.04 
Standard deviation of dependent variable 0.69 3.32 2.93 0.49 3.30 0.98 0.19 
Bandwidth 25.1 23.6 18.9 26.2 24.7 16.4 26.1 
p-value, joint significance of all admission 
coefficients 0.00             
Notes. Estimates are from local linear regressions of the specified order, including separate linear terms for each of the 16 IPN 
cutoff schools and cutoff school-year fixed effects. The edge kernel is used in each regression and in computation of the 
corresponding optimal Imbens-Kalyanaraman bandwidths. The p-values for joint significance are from chi-square tests that the 
admission coefficients are all equal to zero, estimated using seemingly unrelated regression. “At time of assignment" refers to 
all students in the RD sample, while “after dropout" is restricted to students who took the ENLACE exam. Standard errors 
clustered at the admitted high school level are in parentheses. Wild cluster bootstrapped p-values, clustered at the centered 
COMIPEMS score level, are in brackets. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
  
Table 7 
       Regression discontinuity estimates of effect of IPN admission on ENLACE score 
Dependent variable Math score   Spanish score 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
Score ≥ cutoff 0.246*** 0.224*** 0.251*** 
 
0.046 0.048 0.037 
Dustan, de Janvry, and Sadoulet 39 
 
 
(0.0356) (0.0451) (0.0293) 
 
(0.0342) (0.0426) (0.0297) 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
 
[0.04] [0.32] [0.01] 
        Observations 12,115 6,183 20,386 
 
10,693 5,417 19,155 
Adjusted R-squared 0.251 0.184 0.397 
 
0.155 0.132 0.238 
Mean of dependent variable 1 point below cutoff 0.284 0.284 0.284 
 
0.117 0.117 0.117 
Bandwidth 15.6 7.8 31.3 
 
14.1 7.1 28.2 
Lee bound (upper) 0.369*** 0.343*** 0.387*** 
 
0.159*** 0.155*** 0.171*** 
 
(0.0380) (0.0534) (0.0247) 
 
(0.0397) (0.0545) (0.0286) 
Lee bound (lower) 0.118*** 0.095* 0.100*** 
 
-0.114*** -0.116** -0.144*** 
  (0.0373) (0.0554) (0.0220)   (0.0439) (0.0535) (0.0315) 
Notes. Estimates are from local linear regressions of the specified order, including separate linear terms for each of the 16 IPN 
cutoff schools and cutoff school-year fixed effects. The edge kernel is used in each regression and in computation of the 
corresponding optimal Imbens-Kalyanaraman bandwidth. Standard errors clustered at the admitted high school level are in 
parentheses. Wild cluster bootstrapped p-values, clustered at the centered COMIPEMS score level, are in brackets. * p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 8 
       Regression discontinuity estimates of heterogeneous effects of IPN admission on ENLACE subject scores 
Panel A. Math score 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Score ≥ cutoff 0.242*** 0.253*** 0.243*** 0.226*** 0.247*** 0.245*** 0.240*** 
 
(0.0357) (0.0324) (0.0419) (0.0425) (0.0345) (0.0407) (0.0423) 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
(Score ≥ cutoff) * (Middle school GPA) -0.022 








    
[0.29] [0.25] 
(Score ≥ cutoff) * (Parental education) 
 
-0.007 










   
[0.88] 
 (Score ≥ cutoff) * (Change in commute due to 












(Score ≥ cutoff) * change in mean HS peer 














 (Score ≥ cutoff) * (Student resides in Federal 
District)     
-0.013 -0.086 
 
    
(0.0558) (0.0763) 
 
     
[0.73] [0.31] 
 (Score ≥ cutoff) * (Middle school GPA) * 
(Change in commute due to admission)       
-0.007 
      
(0.0056) 
       
[0.15] 
        Observations 12,105 12,926 8,177 8,245 12,115 7,001 8,172 
Adjusted R-squared 0.255 0.287 0.248 0.241 0.257 0.259 0.253 
Mean of dependent variable 1 point below cutoff 0.286 0.272 0.340 0.323 0.284 0.325 0.340 
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Bandwidth 15.6 19.4 13.6 13.4 15.6 13.4 13.7 
Interaction term from Lee upper bound exercisea -0.090* -0.006 -0.001 0.006 -0.035 
  (0.051) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.080) 
  Interaction term from Lee lower bound exercise 0.034 -0.010 -0.007 0.003 0.013 
  (0.045) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.078)     
        Panel B. Spanish score               
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Score ≥ cutoff 0.058 0.038 0.053 0.039 0.050 0.057 0.065 
 
(0.0358) (0.0362) (0.0395) (0.0369) (0.0336) (0.0417) (0.0418) 
 
[0.06] [0.11] [0.09] [0.12] [0.03] [0.12] [0.12] 
(Score ≥ cutoff) * (Middle school GPA) -0.107** 








    
[0.01] [0.01] 
(Score ≥ cutoff) * (Parental education) 
 
0.006 










   
[0.56] 
 (Score ≥ cutoff) * (Change in commute due to 












(Score ≥ cutoff) * change in mean HS peer 














 (Score ≥ cutoff) * (Student resides in Federal 
District)     
0.032 -0.131* 
 
    
(0.0807) (0.0772) 
 
     
[0.53] [0.07] 
 (Score ≥ cutoff) * (Middle school GPA) * 
(Change in commute due to admission)       
-0.017*** 
      
(0.0062) 
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[0.09] 
        Observations 10,687 9,755 8,184 8,805 10,693 7,471 8,179 
Adjusted R-squared 0.164 0.154 0.163 0.160 0.158 0.174 0.173 
Mean of dependent variable 1 point below cutoff 0.114 0.133 0.137 0.136 0.117 0.162 0.137 
Bandwidth 14.1 13.9 14.1 14.2 14.1 14.0 14.1 
Interaction term from Lee upper bound exercisea -0.174*** 0.003 -0.012** 0.009** 0.010 
  (0.047) (0.013) (0.005) (0.004) (0.085) 
  Interaction term from Lee lower bound exercise -0.014 0.007 -0.015*** 0.007* 0.066 
  (0.046) (0.013) (0.006) (0.004) (0.080) 
  Notes. Estimates are from local linear regressions, including separate linear terms for each of the 16 IPN cutoff schools, cutoff school-
year fixed effects, and covariates whose interaction terms are included in the regression. Piecewise-linear terms in centered COMIPEMS 
score are interacted with the corresponding de-meaned covariate in each column. Column 7 includes the interaction of the de-meaned 
middle school GPA and change in commuting distance variables, and this measure's interaction with piecewise-linear terms in centered 
COMIPEMS score. The edge kernel is used in each regression and in computation of the corresponding optimal Imbens-Kalyanaraman 
bandwidths. Standard errors clustered at the admitted high school level are in parentheses. Wild cluster bootstrapped p-values, clustered 
at the centered COMIPEMS score level, are in brackets. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
a Estimation of interaction terms obtained from bounding exercise is described in Section V of the text. 
  
  


























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Score ≥ cutoff 4.698*** 0.115*** 0.292*** -2.265*** 0.019 0.075** 0.061** 
 
(0.6711) (0.0194) (0.0679) (0.6203) (0.0182) (0.0330) (0.0258) 
 
[0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.27] [0.02] [0.07] 
        Observations 7,350 7,350 7,350 9,820 13,215 9,237 10,084 
Adjusted R-squared 0.758 0.753 0.694 0.051 0.016 0.314 0.208 
Mean of dependent variable 
1 point below cutoff 84.554 8.384 11.382 12.895 0.426 0.744 0.320 
Bandwidth 5.1 4.6 5.4 7.5 8.7 11.5 12.1 
Notes. Estimates are from local linear regressions, including separate linear terms for each of the 15 IPN schools (excludes lowest-cutoff 
IPN school) and cutoff school-year fixed effects. The edge kernel is used in each regression and in computation of the corresponding 
optimal Imbens-Kalyanaraman bandwidth. Dependent variables in columns 1-3 are mean characteristics of all students admitted to the 
student's admitted school in his admission year. Standard errors clustered at the admitted high school level are in parentheses. Wild 
cluster bootstrapped p-values, clustered at the centered COMIPEMS score level, are in brackets. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 10 






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Score ≥ cutoff 10.981*** 0.168*** 0.630*** -0.504** -0.030** 0.014 -0.017 
 
(0.5814) (0.0193) (0.0486) (0.2159) (0.0135) (0.0202) (0.0241) 
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.01] [0.54] [0.47] 
        Observations 18,130 21,652 18,130 30,075 43,266 24,498 25,966 
Adjusted R-squared 0.677 0.788 0.681 0.060 0.096 0.141 0.106 
Mean of dependent variable 
1 point below cutoff 67.061 7.999 10.316 6.680 0.453 0.112 0.299 
Bandwidth 5.1 5.6 5.4 8.8 11.5 13.4 14.1 
Notes. Estimates are from local linear regressions, including piecewise-linear terms in COMIPEMS score and cutoff school-year fixed 
effects. The edge kernel is used in each regression and in computation of the corresponding optimal Imbens-Kalyanaraman bandwidth. 
Dependent variables in columns 1-3 are mean characteristics of all students admitted to the student's admitted school in his admission 
year. Standard errors clustered at the admitted high school level are in parentheses. Wild cluster bootstrapped p-values, clustered at the 
centered COMIPEMS score level, are in brackets. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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1 Mexico’s Report on the National Survey of High School Dropout provides extensive insight 
into the patterns and correlates of dropout at the national level (Martínez Espinosa et al. 2012). 
Most dropout appears to be initiated by the student rather than the school, as only 13.9 percent of 
dropouts mention being dropped for failing too many classes or being expelled for disciplinary 
reasons as a principal factor in their decision to leave high school. 
2 Further studies on the impact of specific aspects of school quality on test scores include 
Dearden, Ferri, and Meghir (2002), Newhouse and Beegle (2006), Gould, Lavy, and Paserman 
(2004), Hastings, Kane, and Staiger (2006), Hastings and Weinstein (2008), Cullen, Jacob, and 
Levitt (2005 and 2006), and Lai, de Janvry, and Sadoulet (2010). 
3 Students actually rank programs, not schools. For example, one technical high school may offer 
multiple career track programs.  A student may choose multiple programs at the same school.  
For simplicity we will use the term “school” to refer to a program throughout. No elite school 
has multiple programs at the same school, so this distinction is unimportant for the empirical 
analysis. 
4 The serial dictatorship mechanism is a special case of the common student-proposing deferred 
acceptance (DA) mechanism. DA mechanisms are strategy-proof, provided that students do not 
face a binding constraint on the number of schools that they can list. In practice, only 2 percent 
of students exhaust their 20 choices. 
5 This restriction was removed in 2013, after the period studied in this paper. 
6 In some cases, multiple students with the same score have requested the final seats available in 
a particular school, so that the number of students outnumbers the number of seats. When this 
happens, the representatives in attendance from the respective school subsystem must choose to 
either admit all of the tied applicants, slightly exceeding the initial quota, or reject all of them, 
taking slightly fewer students than the quota.  The number of offered seats and the decisions 
regarding tied applicants are the only means by which administrators determine student 
assignment to schools; otherwise, assignment is entirely a function of the students’ reported 
preferences and their scores. Neither seat quotas nor tie-breaking decisions offer a powerful 
avenue for strategically shaping a school’s student body. 
7 The ENLACE was discontinued after the 2014 round, to be replaced by another exam in 2015. 
8 Our conversations with officials at the Secretariat of Public Education give us the impression 
that, in its initial years, schools did not prioritize preparation for the ENLACE. Results were 
disseminated in a way that did not facilitate easy comparisons between schools: only the school-
level percentages of students falling into four categories of competency were reported, and these 
could only be accessed through the Secretariat’s web portal. One had to either enter the school 
identifier (a code not provided in COMIPEMS application materials) to see the report or 
download a raw data file containing results for all schools in the country. Value-added measures 
were not estimated or published. To address the issue of differential preparation empirically, note 
that the 2008 round of the ENLACE was the first in which the exam was given and that school 
directors and teachers had very minimal understanding of the kinds of questions their students 
would encounter. Despite this limitation on the ability of schools to prepare their students, in 
Appendix Table A1 we see strong effects of admission on math scores and dropout when 
restricting to the 2005 COMIPEMS cohort, most of whom took the ENLACE in 2008. 
9 The original title is “Fuera de la UNAM, 119 mil jóvenes; Sólo 21 mil egresados de la 
secundaria logran lugar en IPN.” 
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10 This discussion refers to the number of available schools in 2005. There have been minor 
changes since then. 
11 Indeed, 43 percent of students assigned to IPN schools in our sample reside in the State of 
Mexico. 
12 An additional difference between the UNAM and other subsystems is that students selecting 
an UNAM school as their first choice during the COMIPEMS assignment process must take a 
version of the entrance exam written by UNAM, which is advertised to be equivalent to the 
standard version in content and difficulty. 
13 Another 3.0 percent graduate from a private high school, compared to 1.1 percent among IPN 
admittees. Disregarding time to completion, 7.9 percent of graduates do so from another public 
subsystem and 4.0 percent do so from a private school. This is an overestimate of the transfer 
rate because a small number of assigned students re-take the COMIPEMS exam in the following 
year and are assigned to a different subsystem. 
14 The elite schools automatically reject all students with a grade point average below seven out 
of ten. Very few students score high enough for admission and fail to meet this requirement. 
15 For example, assuming the student obtains a score of 70, the student’s assignment would be 
his highest-ranked school that has a cutoff score of 70 or below. 
16 Specifically, the admission cutoff is undefined if the student has a middle school GPA below 
seven, if he does not list any IPN schools on his preference list, or if each listed IPN school has a 
non-IPN school with a lower cutoff score listed above it in the preference list. For example, 
suppose a student lists as choice one an UNAM school with cutoff of 70, and choice two is an 
IPN school with a cutoff of 80, and choice three is a non-elite school that is not oversubscribed. 
For scores 70 and above, the student is assigned to the UNAM school, and for scores of 69 and 
below he is assigned to the non-elite school. The IPN assignment is impossible because it is less-
preferred but has a higher cutoff than the more-preferred choice. 
17 There are two reasons for this restriction. First, the UNAM system is elite, and we want to 
estimate the impact of IPN admission versus the counterfactual of non-elite admission. Second, 
the UNAM is missing data on graduation and test scores, so we could not include these students 
in the sample even if we wanted to make this comparison. 
18 Estrada and Gignoux (2015) also take this approach of allowing school-specific cutoffs while 
defining treatment as admission to the IPN system. 
19 The edge kernel is 𝐾! 𝑐! − 𝑐!" = 𝟏 𝑐! − 𝑐!" ≤ ℎ 1− !!!!!"! , where h is the bandwidth. 
We select the optimal bandwidth while omitting the cutoff-year fixed effects and using a single 
set of piecewise-linear terms instead of separate sets for each cutoff school. Having selected the 
bandwidth, we estimate Equation 1 including the fixed effects and cutoff school-specific linear 
terms. 
20 The 2010 data are used in order to match students from the 2006 COMIPEMS cohort who 
took four years to complete high school instead of three. 
21 There is no binding test score ceiling for either exam. Score ceilings present a problem for 
academic gains because there is no way for students with the highest score to demonstrate 
progress. The COMIPEMS exam intentionally avoids a ceiling in order to sort students during 
assignment. 
22 Distance is computed as the straight-line distance from the centroid of the student’s postal 
code to the location of the assigned school. 
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23 Another unlikely explanation for the apparently higher dropout is that IPN students take longer 
to graduate than non-elite students.  Because the ENLACE dataset used in this paper includes 
years 2008 through 2010, it captures COMIPEMS takers from 2005 who took four or five years 
to graduate, and COMIPEMS takers from 2006 who took four years to graduate, instead of the 
standard three years. 
24 Further details are in Appendix B, Section I. 
25 Results from local quadratic regressions are similar for these and all other regressions in the 
paper. 
26 Estrada and Gignoux (2015) provide evidence that IPN admission results in access to better 
school inputs, including somewhat smaller class sizes, more computers per student, and more 
full-time and college-educated teachers. 
27 Our estimates for the effect of admission on dropout are larger than those found in Estrada and 
Gignoux (2015). Appendix Table A1 and its accompanying text give insight into these 
differences, but in brief, we view the difference in results as coming from differences in the 
samples used rather than from a difference in methods. 
28 Using the rectangular kernel results in almost identical estimates, as we show in Appendix 
Table C2. 
29 We also estimate the dropout effect of admission among students whose next-best assignment 
is to a “bachillerato tecnológico” (technical baccalaureate) school. This is the same classification 
as the IPN schools and indicates that their curricula split the difference between strictly 
academically-oriented and vocational focuses.  The estimated dropout effect, presented in 
Appendix Table C3, is somewhat larger than in the full sample results. Thus it seems that it is not 
the broad curricular focus per se that drives the dropout effect. 
30 To test whether this differential came from different IPN schools having both higher admission 
effects on dropout and commute, we re-estimated this equation while including one admission 
dummy variable per cutoff school. This identifies the commuting effect based off of within-
cutoff heterogeneity in commuting changes.  Results are nearly identical. 
31 Appendix Table C5 further restricts the sample to the boroughs the make up the “core” of the 
Federal District and contain 14 of 16 IPN schools. Results are similar to the full-sample 
estimates. 
32 We explore further potential dimensions of heterogeneity (family income, hours per week 
spent studying, and average middle school GPA and COMIPEMS exam score) in Appendix 
Table C6. There is no evidence of differential effects with respect to these covariates. It is worth 
noting that family income and time spent studying are likely to have significant measurement 
error given that they are self-reported. Appendix Table C7 controls for measures of student 
preferences as a robustness check and estimates the differential effect of admission with respect 
to whether the cutoff school was the student’s first choice. The evidence is weak, but suggests 
larger effects when the cutoff school is the first choice. 
33 The high rate of dropout in the sample makes Horowitz and Manski (2000) nonparametric 
bounds uninformative. 
34 We apply the Lee bounding procedure in the case of heterogeneous effects in the following 
way. First, following Lee (2009), we allow the dropout effect to differ with respect to the 
heterogeneity covariate. This is implemented by partitioning the RD sample into four groups, 
divided by the quartiles of the values of the covariate, and then obtaining RD estimates of the 
dropout effect separately for each quartile.  In the case that the covariate is a dummy (Federal 
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District residence), two groups are used instead of four. The ENLACE score sample is then 
trimmed for each of the four groups by the proportion of the corresponding estimated dropout 
effect. The RD specification is then estimated on the trimmed sample. Standard errors are 
bootstrapped as described earlier in this section. Note that this exercise does not generate sharp 
bounds on the interaction terms themselves, but rather it gives the estimated heterogeneous 
effects under Lee’s (2009) extreme assumptions about differential attrition that are used to bound 
average treatment effects. 
35 We find no evidence of a differential effect of commuting distance on either ENLACE subject 
score in the sample of all non-elite cutoff schools, as shown in Appendix Table C4.  This 
suggests that distance per se is probably not causing the differential effect of distance on Spanish 
scores seen in the IPN schools. 
36 The small point estimate for the dropout effect is consistent with all IPN schools having a 
challenging curriculum that increases dropout probability, with limited marginal dropout risk 
increases in higher-cutoff IPN schools. 
37 Note that we again confront the issue that some students in the sample score high enough that 
they are assigned to UNAM schools and thus have missing ENLACE data. We have checked the 
robustness of our results by dropping students who would be assigned to UNAM schools for 
various scores above the cutoff, and results do not change qualitatively. 
38 The component of this reform that addresses curricular harmonization is the Common 
Curricular Framework (“Marco Curricular Común” or “MCC”). The Secretariat of Public 
Education states, “A direct benefit of the MCC is that it will facilitate the creation of 
mechanisms to transfer between different schools and subsystems, which is an important 
advantage for students, who will be less likely to permanently abandon their studies” (Secretaría 
de Educación Media Superior 2008, p. 75). 
